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Accountable Care Organizations 
Franziska Distler 
In the historically fragmented U.S. health care system, care has been delivered by 
multiple providers with little or no coordination, raising issues with access, cost, 
and quality. Under the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) is guiding several experimental programs in health care 
payment and delivery. A fundamental element of this reform is the development of 
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), which offer providers financial rewards 
if they can reduce Medicare cost expansions and ensure quality standards. Alterna-
tive payment models are not only in the center of current U.S. government efforts, 
but have also gained international attention. Due to their heightened importance, 
this essay provides a general overview of ACOs based on a theoretical analysis of 
the existing body of literature. Evaluation of cost reduction and quality improve-
ment of early ACOs show promise but also unintended incentives for providers 
through the benchmarking methodology. Enacting the Final Medicare Shared Sav-
ings Rule in 2016, the government is making continuous efforts to reset providers’ 
incentives to strengthen their satisfaction and maintain ACO participation. 
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1 Healthcare Delivery in America: Shift from Volume to Value 
The American government is making a great effort to change payment models for 
healthcare delivery. The shift from current fee-for-service (FFS) payments to alternative 
payment models aims to provide not only better care for patients but also lower costs 
(CMS, 2016a, p. 1). Turning away from incentivizing providers to increase the volume 
of services, the government strives to tie payments to quality and value. Improving 
healthcare delivery, Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) have a strong impact on 
making this shift. Through this model, a set group of providers are held contractually 
accountable to payers for the cost and quality of the care they provide for a specific 
population (Cimasi, 2013, p. 1).  
The aim of this essay is to provide a general overview of ACOs in America. After ex-
plaining the formation process of accountable care in the 1970s, this paper focusses on 
basic structures of ACOs, like important definitions, compensation information, and par-
ticipating players. The Status Quo in Section 4 contains how ACOs are spread around 
the United States and how they performed so far. For a better understanding of current 
benchmarking challenges, Section 5 points out unintended incentives, resulting ineffi-
ciencies, and the government’s response. It is followed by a conclusion with forecasted 
developments.  
2 Accountable Care: From Managed Care to ACO 
While ACOs have only recently become popular in the American healthcare industry, 
the concept of accountable care is found in the origin of the managed care movement. 
The Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 provided prepaid group practice 
plans as an alternative to America’s traditional fee-for-service system. The act author-
ized $375 million for the development of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), 
which are “prepaid health plan model[s] that use provider networks with a system of 
primary care gatekeepers and capitated provider reimbursement incentivizing decreases 
in utilization and increases in the efficiency of care for HMO members” (Cimasi, 2013, 
p. 5). Reducing the separation between medical service provision and compensation, 
capitation succeeded in controlling healthcare costs in a variety of settings, leading not 
only to an expansion of managed care in the private sector but in the public as well 
(Lagoe et al., 2005, pp. 5-6). The managed care approach flourished all over the United 
States and reached its high point in the mid-1990s. Employers widely accepted these 
less costly HMOs, leading to the enrollment of around 65 million Americans in these 
plans in 1996 (Cimasi, 2013, p. 5; Lagoe et al., 2005, pp. 7-8). While managed care 
performed well in reducing costs, individual providers opposed non-physician control 
over the medical profession and resisted changes in reimbursement models. Parts of the 
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cost-reduction were also due to physicians underproviding services for fear of surpas-
sing their spending thresholds (Cimasi, 2013, p. 5). As a result, patient dissatisfaction 
rose as they saw both their access to care restricted and a decline of medical quality 
(Blendon et al., 1998, pp. 80, 83). This so called managed-care backlash describes a 
dramatic drop of the approach in the late 1990s (Enthoven, 2005, p. 101). History clearly 
indicates that integrated organizations have great potential to reduce costs, but ensuring 
quality and patient’s acceptance is essential for these plans to remain viable. Currently, 
most states have laws ensuring wider public choice and access for still-existing managed 
care plans (Cimasi, 2013, p. 6). 
McClellan et al. (2010) describe the American health system as “neither effective nor 
sustainable” (McClellan et al., 2010, p. 982), characterized by high medical expendi-
tures, overuse, and fragmentation. Compared to all 34 OECD countries, America not 
only spends the greatest share of its gross domestic product on healthcare but also shows 
the greatest relative growth in health expenditures (OECD, 2017). In 2011, almost all 
Medicare spending was FFS payments, creating strong financial incentives for physi-
cians to increase the volume of services they delivered with little incentives to ensure 
value or quality of care (Meyer, 2011, p. 1,228). Against this background, there is great 
interest across the United States in improving health care delivery, performance, and 
payment mechanisms.  
Required by the Affordable Care Act, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
(CMS), an agency within the Department of Health & Human Services (HHS), estab-
lished the Medicare Shared Savings Program in 2012. Using Medicare, the nearly uni-
versal coverage program for older adults, the program aims to provide better care for 
patients, achieve better health for communities, and lower costs through improvements 
in healthcare delivery (Barnes et al., 2014, p. 1 and CMS, 2016a, p. 1). In 2015, for the 
first time in history of the Medicare program, HHS set explicit goals for alternative pay-
ment models. Turning away from FFS payments, it is targeting to tie 85% of all Medi-
care payments to quality or value by the end of 2018 (HHS, 2015). In addition to this 
self-commitment, the statement signals healthcare providers to get involved in alterna-
tive payment models, such as bundled payment. In March 2016, HHS announced that 
they reached the interim goal of tying 30% of Medicare payments to quality ahead of 
schedule. ACOs, which experienced a boom through the MSSP, represent about three 
quarters of this success, allowing health care providers to better coordinate care for Med-
icare patients (HHS, 2016). 
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3 Basic Structures of Accountable Care Organizations 
3.1 Definition and Objectives 
CMS defines ACOs as “groups of doctors, hospitals, and other health care providers, 
who come together voluntarily to give coordinated high-quality care to their Medicare 
patients” (CMS, 2017a). If providers can slow the growth of patient healthcare costs, for 
example by reducing unnecessary services, while ensuring good quality of care, they 
will receive financial rewards. Contrary to the fragmented care that often results from 
FFS payments, ACO providers are striving to deliver seamless, high-quality care for 
Medicare beneficiaries across different care settings (CMS, 2016a, p. 2). 
Known as the Three-Part Aim (originally called Triple Aim), proponents believe that 
ACOs will deliver better quality and outcomes, improved patient experience, and low-
ered per capita costs (Berwick et al., 2008, p. 760 and IHI, 2007, p. 2). While ACO-like 
models have been implemented in the private sector for years, ACOs for Medicare pa-
tients were established nationwide with the Affordable Care Act in 2010 (Auerbach et 
al., 2013, p. 1,781). Intended to shift the delivery of health services from an emphasis 
on volume to an emphasis on value, ACOs constitute an innovative model in America 
(Hofler and Ortiz, 2016, p. 1).  
3.2 Variations in Medicare-ACO Models  
While ACOs administered by CMS receive the most attention, the numerous commer-
cial ACOs are more flexible in individual contract agreements as they are only subject 
to ordinary legislation. The coexistence of various kinds of ACOs creates an ideal envi-
ronment of learning and improvement (Schulte et al., 2017, pp. 373-374). The following 
provides an overview of different types of Medicare ACOs. Besides the regular program, 
CMS is constantly developing and testing different models with a smaller number of 
participants to expand their knowledge for future ACO development.  
With 480 ACOs, the permanent Medicare Shared Saving Program (MSSP) is the most 
popular model administered by CMS. An ACO must apply and meet certain criteria to 
participate, requiring a service population of at least 5,000 Medicare FFS patients and 
participation for at least three years. ACOs can either chose a one-sided risk model, 
where they may receive shared savings but are not liable for shared losses, or the more 
ambitious two-sided model, where they may receive a greater portion of shared savings 
but also share losses (CMS, 2016a, p. 4).  
The Advance Payment ACO Model ran from 2012 to 2015 and was mainly designed for 
physician-based and rural providers. It supported them with upfront and monthly pay-
ments instead of retrospective shared savings, providing the startup capital necessary to 
grow infrastructure and finance staff for care coordination (CMS, 2017b). Maintaining 
the idea of pre-paid shared savings, the ACO Investment Model started in 2015. Building 
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on knowledge gained through Advanced Payment ACOs, it aims to encourage ACOs to 
take on greater financial risk and to set up new ACOs, especially in underserved areas.  
The more advanced Pioneer ACO Model only addressed providers with previous expe-
rience in coordinating care and managing the appropriate infrastructure. Running until 
2016, Pioneer ACOs took on higher levels of shared savings and risks than any other 
ACOs in the MSSP and were designed to test innovative ways of compensating and 
regulation (CMS, 2017f). For example, they derived most of their clinical service reve-
nues from value-based payments of private insurers, with some ACOs converting parts 
of their FFS reimbursements into a monthly population-based payment (Pham et al., 
2014, p. 1,636). Even with experienced leadership, this ACO model turned out to be 
very challenging. While only 8 of the initial 32 Pioneer ACOs remained in the fifth and 
final performance year, most switched to the less ambitious and lower risk MSSP. Grow-
ing from these experiences, CMS announced the Next Generation ACO Model at the end 
of 2016, providing 44 organizations with the opportunity to take high levels of financial 
risks and rewards. The model provides better predictability of financial targets through 
refined benchmarking and tools to support patient engagement and care (CMS, 2017e).  
Finally, the Comprehensive ESRD Care Model strives to improve care for beneficiaries 
with End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD). As this disease is causing complex health needs 
and requires multiple provider visits, the model aims to create incentives for improved 
patient-centered and coordinated care as well as reduce medical costs associated with 
this condition (CMS, 2017d).  
3.3 Healthcare Providers  
Any Medicare-enrolled provider or supplier is free to join an ACO. The collaboration 
can be composed of a range of healthcare organizations such as hospitals, independent 
practice associations, multi-specialty medical collaborations and groups of doctors or 
other providers (Goldsmith, 2011, p. 33). The Medicare ACO programs do not specify 
a set composition of providers that must be included, requiring only a minimum service 
population of Medicare beneficiaries (Colla et al., 2016, p. 432).  
3.4 Compensation via Benchmarking  
Healthcare providers participating in Medicare ACOs receive regular remuneration for 
covered Medicare services through the FFS system. Additionally, ACO annual perfor-
mance is measured against an individual benchmark calculated by CMS that indicates 
whether the ACO generated savings or losses for the Medicare program. The benchmark 
is an estimation of “what the total Medicare Fee-For-Service […] expenditures for as-
signed ACO beneficiaries would otherwise have been in the absence of the ACO” and 
is updated every year (CMS, 2016a, p. 4). Following the idea of value-based payments, 
a combination of efficiency and quality is needed for reward (McCellan et al., 2014, p. 
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1,509). Therefore, only “ACOs that meet or exceed a minimum savings rate (MSR), 
satisfy minimum quality performance standards, and otherwise maintain their eligibility 
to participate in the Shared Savings Program are eligible to receive a portion of the sav-
ings they generate” (CMS, 2017a, p. 3). The CMS quality measurements are classified 
in four, equally weighted domains: patient experience, care coordination/patient safety, 
preventive health, and at-risk population. Over the three-year implementation period, 
CMS payments shift from ACOs simply reporting these measures to the entities bearing 
risk for meeting performance targets (MedPac, 2016, p. 3). 
3.5 Patient’s Assignment 
Unlike HMOs and managed care programs, ACOs do not limit patients in their choice 
of healthcare provider. Beneficiaries are freely able to choose any Medicare-enrolled 
provider regardless of their participation in an ACO (MedPac, 2016, p. 1). However, if 
an attributed patient chooses a provider outside of the ACO, the ACO remains respon-
sible for the costs. This incentivize physicians to provide patients with exceptional care 
in order to maximize ACO retention (MedPac, 2016, p. 1). From a patient’s perspective, 
coordinated care and quality improvements are intended to lead to less paperwork and 
fewer repeated medical tests due to electronic health record utilization (Barnes et al., 
2014, p. 2).  
Nevertheless, CMS has to assign beneficiaries to an ACO since the yearly performance-
measurement is based on a defined patient population. In most cases, the assignment is 
made retrospectively at the end of each year based on the population served during that 
period. For advanced two-sided models, a prospective method uses data from one year 
to assign patients to the ACO for the following year (CMS, 2016a, p. 6). Generally, 
prospective methods avoid problems of free-riding and resource expenditure on patients 
who are not attributed to the ACO, while retrospective methods ensure a larger overlap 
of the assigned and the treated populations (Lewis et al., 2014, p. 592).  
4 Status Quo – ACOs in America 
4.1 Number of ACOs 
The consulting company Leavitt Partners estimates a total of 838 public and private 
ACOs in January 2016, showing a significant increase in previous years as shown in 
Figure 1. With an estimated 28.3 million people, ACOs are covering 8.9% of the Amer-
ican population (Muhlestein and McClellan, 2016). 
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Figure 1: ACOs Over Time 
 
Adapted from: Muhlenstein and McClellan, 2016. 
More than 600 ACOs are managed by CMS. Currently they register 480 MSSP ACOs, 
45 Investment Model ACOs, 37 Comprehensive ESRD Care Model ACOs and 44 Next 
Generation Model ACOs. Still, contracts of private payers usually cover lager numbers: 
The 17.2 million lives covered by private payer ACOs dwarfs the 11.1 million covered 
by MSSP ACOs in 2016 (Muhlestein and McClellan, 2016). 
4.2 Composition of Healthcare Providers  
More than half of ACOs include a hospital, which generally provides more capital, ad-
vanced data sharing, and better engagements of providers across the care continuum 
(Colla et al., 2016, p. 437). Additionally, hospital care influences several ACO quality 
measures, such as readmission rates and medication reconciliation. Still, findings indi-
cate that “ACOs with a hospital do not report significant differences in their capabilities, 
compared to their counterparts without a hospital” (Colla et al., 2016, p. 437). Hospitals 
might not be able to fully commit to reducing spending as they typically own many 
players of the health care provider team, such as laboratory services, rehab facilities etc. 
Targeting savings within the ACO might thereby reduce the revenue of their own hold-
ings (Brennan, 2016). The fact that physician-led and integrated (physician-hospital 
partnerships) ACOs are more likely to achieve shared savings, supports this assumption 
(Muhlestein et al., 2016). Besides fewer bureaucratic layers, physicians might be able to 
negotiate better prices for external services and can generate savings by reducing emer-
gency department and hospital admissions, which lower revenue for hospitals (Finne-
gan, 2017). Contrary to previous concerns that hospitals dominate ACO leadership be-
cause of their managerial strengths and resources, physicians have a major impact, lead-
ing 51% of ACOs alone and 33% jointly with hospitals (Colla et al., 2014, p. 694).   
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According to the 2015 Medicare report, the best-performing ACOs are not only physi-
cian-led but also older and smaller. Older ACOs are at an advantage since they have had 
more time to improve their health care delivery models and their internal structures. In 
pursuit of finding the best service provision model, smaller ACOs also succeed by adapt-
ing to changes quickly (Brennan, 2016). The smallest ACOs with about 5,600 patients 
generated savings of $114.70 per beneficiary while the largest ACOs with about 46,600 
patients generated losses of $23.93 per capita (Muhlestein et al., 2016). Even if CMS 
was taking great efforts to encourage the creation of large, consolidated health systems 
to increase efficiency and functional integration in the past, the 2015 results suggest that 
it might be more important to emphasize the performance of smaller ACOs (Muhlestein 
et al., 2016). 
4.3 Geographical Distribution 
A key marker of where ACOs are forming is pre-existing provider integrations such as 
hospital systems and large groups of primary care physicians (Auerbach et al., 2013, pp. 
1,786-1,787). As shown in Figure 4.2, most MSSP ACOs are located in metro areas like 
Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, New York, Philadelphia and San Francisco, with 62% of 
ACOs found in high population density areas and only 12% in low population density 
areas (CMS, 2017c). 
Interestingly, MSSP ACOs are not preferentially located in areas with high per capita 
Medicare spending or a high percentage of the area’s Medicare population (CMS, 
2017c). Even if it seems intuitive that high spending indicates unnecessary care and a 
great potential of future cost reduction, Auerbach et al. (2013) found out that a lack of 
key infrastructure and limited ability to integrate care characterize these regions. This 
might decrease strategic options for ACOs and therefore make these areas less preferred 
locations.   
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Figure 2: MSSP ACO Assigned Beneficiary Population by ACO by Country 
 
Source: CMS, 2017c. 
4.4 Prerequisites and Performance 
Through today’s expanding knowledge of healthcare costs, growing opportunities in big 
data, and experience in collaborating with other health care providers, ACOs have a 
higher likelihood to succeed compared to the managed care approaches of the 1990s. 
Patient freedom to use ACO services and select a provider independently reduces mis-
trust and dissatisfaction in the population (Emanuel, 2012, pp. 2,263-2,264). Expanded 
physician governance increases acceptance, as physicians prefer an ACO model that 
permits a greater level of independence and self-governance (Cimasi, 2013, p. 6). Addi-
tionally, providers do not have to take on as much financial risk as those in HMOs, 
which carried up to 100% of the risk, and can now use electronic health records to inte-
grate care (Barnes et al., 2014, pp. 5-6). In the following, performance results of Medi-
care ACOs are focused because they are subject to a mandatory and independent evalu-
ation through CMS. As there are no such regulations in private sector, results of com-
mercial ACOs might be published incompletely or biased (Schulte et al., 2017, pp. 539-
540).  
According to CMS, Medicare ACOs generated more than $466 million savings in 2015 
and a total of $1.29 billion from 2012 to 2015. Even if more ACOs received shared 
savings than in previous years, the number remains less than one third of all ACOs. To 
share in savings, ACOs not only have to satisfy minimum quality performance standards 
but also meet the MSR. While 8 of all 12 Pioneer ACOs generated savings, only six had 
sufficient savings to receive a portion of them (CMS, 2016c). Looking at individual 
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results, many ACOs missed their benchmarks by millions of dollars. An analysis by 
Introcaso and Berger (2015) revealed that the $341 million in shared savings in 2014 
were highly concentrated among the 86 most successful ACOs.  
Generally, high-risk ACOs remain unpopular. In January 2017, the clear majority of 438 
MSSP ACOs (91%) are participating in the one-sided model while 9% has chosen the 
two-sided model (CMS, 2017c). Summarizing the financial results of MSSP ACOs in 
2015, more ACOs saved rather than lost relative to their benchmarks. While Medicare 
saved $429 million, it paid out $646 million in shared savings to MSSP ACOs. The net 
program losses of $216 million are due to the high proportion of one-sided ACO models 
that receive shared savings but are not liable for losses (MedPac, 2016, p. 4). CMS uses 
pilot ACOs to evaluate how incentives can increase ACO enrollment and convince pro-
viders to take higher risks. Organizations identify lack of capital, absence of integrated 
IT systems, and deficiency of evidence-based treatment protocol data as the obstacles in 
forming ACOs (AMN Healthcare, 2011). Additionally, according to Hofler and Ortiz 
(2016), joining an ACO can raise costs for primary care providers up to 10%, meaning 
higher costs per patient visit during the first several years. Implementing essential ACO 
infrastructure, such as an electronic health record system and hiring the necessary ad-
ministrative staff, can be very costly. 
CMS describes a constant increase in the quality of services, reporting that ACOs im-
proved on 84% of the quality measures. Significantly, all 12 Pioneer ACOs improved 
their scores from 2012 to 2015 by over 21 percentage points (CMS, 2016c). While CMS 
results suggest great success in Medicare ACOs, they only cover a small share of the 
American healthcare market and the results have a relatively small sample size. Even if 
a final evaluation about ACO success cannot be made at this point, the rising number of 
ACOs indicates widespread organizational faith in the program and significant saving 
potential. 
5 Challenge Benchmarking: Unintended Incentives and CMS Response 
The ACO benchmarking system was strongly criticized in years past. At the start of 
MSSP, every ACO can choose between the one- or two-sided risk model for its first 
three-year period (see Chapter 3.2). For that time, CMS sets a spending target for the 
ACO to receive shared savings. The benchmark is a weighted average of the healthcare 
costs for the attributed patients over the last three years, including annual adjustments 
for patient characteristics and anticipated growth in Medicare FFS expenditures (Harvey 
et al., 2014, p. 123). Assuming that more recent spending is more predictive of current 
ACO expenditures, the most recent year receives the highest weight. For example, for 
an ACO that started in 2016 spending for patients served in 2015 received a weight of 
0.6 while spending in 2014 and 2013 received weights of 0.3 and 0.1, respectively (Dou-
ven et al., 2015, p.143). 
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CMS uses the same method to recalculate the benchmark at the start of each new three-
year contract term. This process implies that ACOs which still show high Medicare ex-
penditures at the end of the first term will receive a higher benchmark and hold greater 
potential to generate savings in the second term. Similarly, ACOs that generated signif-
icant savings in the first term receive tightened benchmarks in the second. In order to 
receive shared savings, these well-performing organizations do not only have to main-
tain previous expenditure levels but also achieve additional cost reductions. This creates 
hardship on ACOs in this position, with fewer safe and effective saving opportunities 
remaining for an ACO to take in upcoming terms.  By “placing an ACO in a race against 
itself” (Harvey et al., 2014, p. 122) and penalizing previous cost reductions with lower 
benchmarks for the next period instead of rewarding, the MSSP creates unintended in-
centives (Douven et al., 2015, pp. 143-144). Instead of reducing unnecessary medical 
services, ACOs may be constrained to increase spending, especially shortly before new 
benchmark calculations, to receive a better benchmark for the future. One estimate sug-
gests that “for every dollar increase in spending in the last year before an ACO starts a 
new three-year contract, the ACO will get back between $1.48 and $1.90 during the 
contract period” (Douven et al., 2015, p. 143). This turns out to be profitable for ACOs 
but describes the opposite of the original target to reduce Medicare expenditures (Dou-
ven et al., 2015, pp. 143, 146). 
In June 2016, CMS announced the Final Medicare Shared Savings Program Rule in 
order to “continue broad-based program participation and improve program function 
and transparency” (CMS, 2016b). In effect, CMS modified the process for resetting 
benchmarks for the second and subsequent agreement periods, beginning in 2017. In-
stead of using national Medicare spending data, CMS will now use regional spending 
growth trends to update ACO benchmarks while removing the adjustment that accounts 
for the savings generated in the period shortly before the new agreement. Because re-
gional spending is determined by all providers in the area, this change limits the link 
between ACO performance and future benchmarks (Rose et al., 2016, p. 441). The re-
based historical benchmark will now reflect ACO efficiency in relation to other regional 
providers (CMS, 2016b). 
Although very promising, the use of regional data and the resulting convergence in 
benchmarks between ACOs with spending above and below local average FFS spending 
could cause less-well-performing ACOs to leave the program, as the new spending tar-
get falls below their reach (Rose et al., 2016, p. 441). To avoid this circumstance, CMS 
also announced a phased-in approach for ACOs with higher-than-average regional 
spending that applies a lower weight to the benchmark’s regional adjustment component 
in the beginning (CMS, 2016b). 
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Oppositely, with the new benchmark reflecting the average of high- and low-spending 
providers in the area, Rose et al. (2016) highlight, that well-performing ACOs with be-
low-baseline spending may not be incentivized to further improve their performance. 
Recognizing that a shift to a two-sided model promises the greatest savings to these 
organizations, CMS provided the opportunity for one-sided ACOs to extend their initial 
benchmark contract for an additional year before the shift to the two-sided model (CMS, 
2016b). Future evaluations will show if the adapted benchmark methodology can reach 
its goals of both strengthening provider satisfaction and increasing ACO participation 
rates.  
6 ACOs - Opportunities and Limitations 
Auerbach et al. (2013) describe ACOs as “the heart of the government’s efforts to trans-
form healthcare delivery in the United States to a more coordinated, high-quality and 
efficient system” (Auerbach, 2013, p. 1,786) and underline that the cooperation and con-
tinued growth alongside private-sector ACOs has the potential to change the orientation 
of care systems in America. Trying to avoid circumstances which caused the managed 
care backlash, ACOs differ in several aspects from HMOs. Voluntary participation, less 
financial risk, more advanced outcome measurements, and knowledge of care manage-
ment increases provider acceptance while more coordinated and better quality care at-
tracts and retains patients. Nevertheless, ACOs might also face serious problems, as they 
gradually take on greater financial risk that could negatively affect the quality of care 
through rationing, denial of care, or ACO organizational instability. Additionally, con-
solidation of providers could lead to expanded market power and monopolization, re-
sulting in higher prices (Barnes et al., 2014, pp. 5-6). To prevent future setbacks, CMS 
strives to improve the position of ACOs through policies such as adapting the bench-
marking methodology to accommodate variably performing organizations.  
Even as the number of ACOs increases and innovative ACO models raise international 
awareness of alternative payment models, Barnes et al. (2014) underline the limited im-
pact of ACOs on health expenditures. They may lower costs marginally, but overall, 
expenditures will remain high unless the demand for acute medical care and the price of 
care decrease. Thus, socio-economic factors like food supply, unemployment and envi-
ronment have to be simultaneously targeted as the origin of medical demand (Barnes et 
al., 2014, p. 7).  
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